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Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 and the
Houdaille Case: A New Trade Remedy?*
by Patrick F. J. Macrory**
and Kenneth I. Juster***
On May 3, 1982, Houdaille Industries, Inc. (Houdaille), a U.S.
machine tool manufacturer, filed a petition with the U.S. Government
requesting that the President suspend indefinitely the investment tax
credit available to purchasers of numerically controlled machining cen-
ters and punching machines imported from Japan.' The petition was
based on Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971, which gives the Presi-
dent authority to deny application of the investment tax credit on im-
ported articles when the government of the exporting country "engages
in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of international car-
tels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce." '2 The
petition alleged that the Government of Japan had for many years fos-
tered a cartel among Japanese machine tool manufacturers, which had
given them an unfair advantage in competing with American manufac-
turers in the U.S. market.
After nearly a year of deliberation, on April 22, 1983, the U.S. Gov-
ernment announced without explanatory comment, that it had "decided
* Some of the ideas expressed in this article first appeared in an article published (in
Japanese) at 10 J. JAP. INST. OF INT, Bus. L. 358 (1982).
** Partner, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., B.A. 1962, M.A. 1968, Oxford University;
LL.M. 1970, George Washington University. Mr. Macrory is Co-chairman of the Committee
on International Trade, ABA Section on International Law and Practice. He is also a member
of the International Law Advisory Council, Washington College of Law, American University,
and an Adjunct Professor at the Washington School of Law, American University.
*** Associate, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., A.B. 1976, Harvard College; M.P.P.
1980, John F. Kennedy School of Government; J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School.
I Petition to the President of the United States Through the Office of the United States
Trade Representative for the Exercise of Presidential Discretion Authorized by Section 103 of
the Revenue Act of 1971, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D), Houdaille Industries, Inc., Petitioner (May 3,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Petition]. For additional discussion of the petition see Copaken, The
Iloudaile Pettion: A New Weapon Against Unfair Industy Targeting Practices, 17 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 211 (1983).
Under Section 38 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 38 (1982), a tax credit is
available to purchasers of qualified investment property. The credit is equal to ten percent of
the purchase price of the property and is used to reduce the income tax owed by the purchaser.
See infra text accompanying notes 24-30.
2 Revenue Act of 1973, § 103, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1982).
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to deny the relief requested in the petition filed by Houdaille. ' '3 At the
same time, it stated that it intended to pursue with the Japanese Govern-
ment the issues raised by the Houdaille case and that, as part of this
effort, officials from the two countries would hold talks on Tokyo's indus-
try-related policies and their impact on trade. 4 The Administration did
not rule out the possibility of further action in the future regarding the
allegations in the Houdaille petition.
The petition by Houdaille was the first time that Section 103 of the
Revenue Act of 1971 had been invoked. Indeed, prior to its filing this
provision had been ignored or overlooked by lawyers engaged in interna-
tional trade. It was unfortunate, therefore, that the U.S. Government
failed to explain its denial of the relief requested by Houdaille. As a
result, many of the issues raised about Section 103 as a possible trade
remedy available to domestic industries seeking to restrict imports into
the United States were left unanswered. This article addresses several of
those issues in the context of examining the Houdaille case.
The article is divided into two principal sections. The first section
discusses the background and substance of the Houdaille petition; the
second section discusses some of the important issues regarding Section
103 which are raised by this case. The article concludes that, although
Section 103 was not an appropriate trade remedy under the circum-
stances of the Houdaille case, it remains a potential tool for import relief
in more limited circumstances when other trade statutes are
inapplicable.
3 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release, Brock Announces Decision on
Houdaille Pelition (Apr. 22, 1983). The entire announcement was as follows:
The United States Trade Representative William E. Brock announced today
that the United States Government has decided to deny the relief requested in the
petition filed by Houdaille Industries, Inc., under Section 103 of the Revenue Act
of 1971.
The petition did raise questions concerning the possible effects on U.S. com-
merce of certain Japanese practices. For this reason, while denying the relief re-
quested, Ambassador Brock announced that he will begin consultations with the
Government of Japan concerning these practices. Japan has committed to begin
such talks immediately. Ambassador Brock further stated 'It is important that
these discussions effectively deal with these problems, making further action
unnecessary.'
4 Id. The bilateral committee formed for these discussions is known as the U.S.-Japan
Committee on Industry-Related Policies and Their Impact on Trade. The first of what is ex-
pected to be a bimonthly series of meetings was held in Japan on May 14-16, 1983. Deputy
U.S. Trade Representative Michael Smith led the U.S. delegation; Kunio Komatsu, Vice Min-
ister of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"), led the Japanese delega-
tion. There are reportedly three phases planned for the discussions: (1) understanding the
constituent elements of Japan's industrial policy; (2) determining what elements, if any, affect
trade with the United States; and (3) making appropriate policy recommendations on how the
U.S. should respond. 98 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES L-10 (BNA)(May 19, 1983); 19 INT'L
TRADE REP. EXPORT WEEKLY 201 (BNA)(May 10, 1983); 81 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES
LL-2 (BNA)(April 26, 1983).
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I. Background and Context of the Houdaille Case
A. The Machtne Tool Industry in the United States
Machining technology is at the very base of the way of life in an
industrialized society.5 Almost all manufactured products used today
are in some way dependent on machine tools or on machines built by
machine tools. There are numerous types of machine tools, which vary in
size and in types of work they perform. The diverse nature of machine
tools ranges from boring, grinding, and threading implements to press-
ing, bending, and die-casting devices. One of the more significant recent
developments in machinery technology has been the introduction of nu-
merically controlled units. 6 Numerical control is a method of accurately
controlling the movement of machine tools by a series of programmed
numerical data which activate the motors of the machine tool. Punched
cards or tape provide numerically controlled machines with detailed in-
formation regarding the particular part to be produced. The machine
decodes this punched information and electronic devices activate the
various motors on the machine tool, causing them to follow specific
instructions.7
The two types of machine tools covered by the Houdaille petition
are numerically controlled machining centers (n.c. machining centers)
and numerically controlled punching machines (n.c. punching ma-
chines). Houdaille is one of the domestic manufacturers of n.c. machin-
ing centers and n.c. punching machines.8
Although the early development in the United States of n.c.
machine tools gave the U.S. industry a substantial lead over foreign com-
petitors in international markets, and enabled the United States to main-
tain its world leadership in machine tool exports, that situation has
changed dramatically in recent years as foreign manufacturers, especially
the Japanese, have made advances in machining technology. Not only
has the U.S. machine tool industry's share of world exports steadily de-
clined over the last two decades, but the industry has suffered a signifi-
cant loss of its own domestic market share. 9 Since at least 1981, it has
experienced a decreasing backlog of orders, low levels of new orders, and
increased pressures from imports.10
5 See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF
THE U.S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY (1983) [hereinafter cited as MACHINE TOOL STATUS].
6 See generaly A. ROBERTS & R. PRENTICE, PROGRAMMING FOR NUMERICAL CONTROL
MACHINES (1968).
7 S. KRAR, J. OSWALD & J. ST. AMAND, TECHNOLOGY OF MACHINE TOOLS 458-59 (2d
ed. 1977).
8 Houdaille Industries, Inc., is a diversified manufacturer of industrial products, only
some of which are machine tools. Statement of John Latona, Vice President - Law, Houdaille
Industries, Inc., before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, June 7,
1983, at 1, 4 [hereinafter cited as Latona testimony].
9 MACHINE TOOL STATUS, supra note 5, at 8, 15.
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1982, at D4; Id, August 30, 1982 at D-1; Wall St. J.,
March 29, 1983, at I.
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The shifts in market size and share have been especially pronounced
with respect to n.c. machining centers and n.c. punching machines. The
size of the domestic market for n.c. machining centers more than tripled
between 1976 and 1981. While the total volume of sales by U.S. manu-
facturers also grew during this period, though at a somewhat slower rate,
the market share of the same manufacturers declined from ninety-five
percent in 1976 to slightly under fifty percent in 1981. In contrast, the
Japanese share of the U.S. market rose from less than four percent in
1976 to fifty percent in 1981. I I
Similar trends are apparent in the n.c. punching machine market.
The size of the domestic market for n.c. punching machines doubled be-
tween 1976 and 1981. Although the total volume of sales by U.S. manu-
facturers also grew during this period, the relative market shares of U.S.
and Japanese companies shifted greatly. With these shifts in market
share, the U.S. machine tool industry now finds itself in a troubled state.
Officials of the National Machine Tool Builders' Association contend
that some form of import relief is a necessary element to the economic
recovery of the industry.i 2
B. Japanese Industrial Pol'cy
The Houdaille petition was in essence an attack on the successful
application of industrial policy by the Government of Japan to the Japa-
nese machine tool industry. Indeed, it is significant that the one affirma-
tive step the U.S. Government took when it denied the Houdaille
petition was to initiate discussions with the Government of Japan regard-
ing Tokyo's industry-related policies and their impact on trade. 13
Industrial policy is generally defined as the application of govern-
ment resources and influence to promote selected, vital industries within
a state.14 The objective of industrial policy is to raise the real income of
the population by shifting resources to those sectors of industry in which
they can be most productive. The guiding principle behind industrial
I Id. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PUB. No. MQ-35W,
CURRENT INDUSTRIAL REPORTS: METALWORKING MACHINERY (1983); NATIONAL MACHINE
TOOL BUILDERS, BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIC HANDBOOK OF THE MACHINE TxL
INDUSTRY (1980-81); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PUB. No. FT 246,
U.S. IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION AND GENERAL IMPORTS (1983).
12 Cole, Tool Order Drop Citedfor April, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1983, at 35. Interestingly,
however, the Association did not join in the Houdaille petition. It instead filed a petition under
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982), seeking import relief on
the ground that imports of machine tools are endangering the national security of the United
States. It has been reported that the Department of Commerce, which is charged with carrying
out investigations under § 232, has made an affirmative recommendation to the President, but
that other agencies including the Departments of State and of Treasury, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers, are opposed to granting import relief.
See Inside U.S Trade, March 16, 1984, at 1.
13 See supra note 4.
14 See Samuelson, A Competitive Edgefor Foreign Firms?, Washington Post, Oct. 19, 1982, at
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policy is that of international competitive advantage; a country's real
industrial wage can rise substantially over time only if its labor and capi-
tal flow toward increasingly higher-value added, higher productivity
industries. 15
The basic aim of industrial policy, therefore, is to identify the best
way to encourage growth, or to adjust to the decline, of a particular sec-
tor of the economy. The tools employed in industrial policy include the
following: credit rationing; favorable access to investment funds and for-
eign exchange; the use of rationalization cartels; joint research and devel-
opment programs; control over licensing of technology; use of tariffs,
quotas, and export controls; and administrative guidance. 16
The Japanese have taken industrial policy seriously, from their ini-
tial industrialization following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, up through
the present, with particular emphasis during the post-World War II pe-
riod. 17 According to one set of commentators, the three main elements in
Japanese industrial development are the following:
(i) recognition of the country's need to develop a highly competitive
manufacturing sector;
(ii) the deliberate restructuring of industry over time towards higher
value added, higher productivity industries. (The Japanese call
these industries 'knowledge intensive');
(iii) aggressive domestic and international business strategies. 18
In the face of widespread industrial destruction and critical shortages of
capital following World War II and the Occupation, Japan undertook
the restructuring of its economy by encouraging and facilitating invest-
ment in industries considered basic to an industrialized economy. Dur-
ing the early postwar period, the Japanese marshalled an impressive
array of industrial policy instruments to foster investment-led growth.
Significant financial support for industrial development coupled with ex-
tensive controls over trade and capital flows constitute the foundation
upon which Japan grew to be an economic power. Throughout the
1970s, as the Japanese economy grew in size and strength, Japan began
to dismantle many of its industrial policy tools in response to pressure
from its major trading partners. 19
One sector which has received attention from the Government of
Japan since World War II is the machinery industry, including the man-
ufacturing and producing of machine tools. Specifically, the Japanese
Diet has enacted three "Temporary Measures Laws" designed to stimu-
15 See I. MAGAZINER & T. HOUT, JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY, ch. 2 (1980).
16 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE APPROACH 4
(1982).
17 The United States, by contrast, has taken the free market/regulatory path to industrial
development. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION, COMM. ON BANKING,
FINANCE, AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR
AMERICA: IS IT NEEDED? 23 (R. Reich) (Comm. Print 1983).
1B 1. MAGAZINER & T. HOUT, supra note 15, at 4.
19 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 26-48.
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late and promote the development of the machinery industry: the Law
for Temporary Measures to Promote the Machinery Industry (enacted in
1956; expired in 1971); the Law for Temporary Measures to Promote
Specific Electronic Industries and Machinery Industries (enacted in
1971; expired in 1978); and the Law for Temporary Measures to Pro-
mote Specific Machinery and Information Industries (enacted in 1978).20
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") has been
the government organ empowered by the Temporary Measures Laws to
implement the policies expressed in those laws.
As authorized by the Temporary Measures Laws, the Japanese Cab-
inet designated certain machine tools as among those products covered
by the laws. MITI then exercised its power under the Temporary Meas-
ures Laws to instruct machine tool companies to cooperate in specific
areas in order to fulfill the purposes of the laws.21 The actions taken by
Japanese machine tool companies, therefore, had to comply with MITI's
instructions, and, theoretically, could neither be detrimental to the inter-
ests of consumers or to those enterprises engaged in related industries,
nor be unfairly discriminatory. 22
The Japanese Diet also enacted the Export and Import Trade Law
in 1952 to promote the sound development of foreign trade by establish-
ing an orderly system for export and import trading. MITI again is the
government organ empowered to implement the policies expressed in the
Export and Import Trade Law. Under the law, MITI can instruct the
relevant Japanese industry or exporters' association to enter into ar-
rangements necessary to promote foreign trade in an orderly fashion.
According to the petition, MITI did just that in 1977 in connection with
the export of certain n.c. machining centers and n.c. lathes to the United
States and Canada, when it instructed Japanese exporters of those
machine tools to enter into an arrangement under Article 11, Paragraph
2 of the Export and Import Trade Law. In compliance with these in-
structions, the Japan Machinery Exporters' Association, which includes
exporters of n.c. machining centers and n.c. lathes among its members,
made arrangements in March, 1978 with respect to minimum prices and
other matters related to exports in North America. These arrangements
were to conform with Japanese antitrust laws. 23
C Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971
In seeking a trade remedy, Houdaille chose to look beyond those
20 See Japanese Governments' Response to U.S. Government Concerning Unfair Trade
Practices Petition Filed by Houdaille Industries, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
631-33 (Aug. 18, 1982) [hereinafter cited as ITIM]. These laws will hereinafter be referred to
collectively as the Temporary Measures Laws.
21 See tnfra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a summary of Houdaille's allegations
regarding the cooperative activities authorized by MITI.
22 ITIM, supra note 20, at 632.
23 ITIM, supra note 20, at 632-33.
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statutes traditionally available for regulating foreign trade, such as the
countervailing duty law 24 or the escape clause. 25 Instead, Houdaille in-
voked a relatively unknown statute which had never before been used as
a trade remedy: Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971.26 This was an
important development because it opened up the possibility that Section
103 could become a powerful new weapon in the arsenal available to
domestic industries seeking to restrict imports into the United States.
Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 added Section 48(a)(7) to
the Internal Revenue Code's provisions on the investment tax credit.
The investment tax credit is a benefit which permits a taxpayer to credit
against income tax a certain percentage of amounts invested in qualified
depreciable property. Subsection 48(a)(7)(D) grants the President of the
United States authority to exclude certain property either completed
abroad or predominantly of foreign origin from qualifying for the invest-
ment tax credit. The text of subsection 48(a)(7)(D) provides as follows:
"If, on or after the date of the termination of Proclamation 4074 [De-
cember 19, 1971], the President determines that a foreign country-
(i) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including variable import
fees, which substantially burden United States commerce in a
manner inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements, or
(ii) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of
international cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United
States commerce,
he may provide by Executive order for the application of subparagraph
(A) [excluding foreign-produced property from eligibility for the invest-
ment tax credit] to any article or class of articles manufactured or pro-
duced in such foreign country for such period as may be provided by
Executive order."
2 7
24 The countervailing duty law, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982), is designed to offset the effect in
the U.S. market of the subsidization of imports by foreign governments. If the petitioning do-
mestic industry can establish that the products imported into the U.S. have benefited from a
subsidy and that, in the case of countries which have signed the Tokyo Round Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, the domestic industry has been materially injured or
threatened with material injury, the U.S. Government must impose a countervailing duty equal
in amount to the margin of subsidization.
25 Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982), known as the "escape
clause," is designed to provide import relief to the industry in question while the industry ad-
justs to new competitive conditions. If the petitioning domestic industry can establish that im-
ports are increasing and that the increased imports are a "substantial cause" of serious injury to
the industry, then the President has discretion to choose the measure best suited to facilitate the
orderly adjustment to new competitive conditions.
2'3 Revenue Act of 1971, § 103, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1982). A spokesman for
Houdaille stated that the company invoked Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 rather than
some other trade remedies because in its opinion, unlike those other remedies, "Section 103
provides a very effective remedy with maximum administrative flexibility." Latona Testimony,
supra note 8, at 5-6.
27 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1982). Subparagraph A provides in pertinent part:
Property shall not be treated as section 38 [i.e., qualified] property if-
(i) such property was completed outside the United States, or
(ii) less than 50 percent of the basis of such property is attributable to value
added within the United States.
26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(A) (1982).
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One of the main differences between the two criteria is that subsec-
tion 48(a)(7)(D)(i) requires the action by the foreign country to be in
violation of a trade agreement, while subsection 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) does not.
The latter merely requires "discriminatory or other acts (including toler-
ance of international cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United
States commerce." Although this criterion includes any act or policy of a
foreign government that has the effect of unjustifiably restricting United
States commerce, there is explicit reference to two types of conduct: dis-
criminatory acts and tolerance of international cartels.
The Houdaille petition focused on the "tolerance of international
cartels" language. It argued, by examining various pieces of U.S. legisla-
tion, that this expression referred "not only to the tolerance of cartels
with transnational membership, but also to the tolerance of domestic car-
tels with international effects." '28 The petition then interpreted the "re-
stricting United States commerce" language to mean "a curtailment of
sales by U.S. companies or the displacement of such bustness by sales offoreign
products."'29 Houdaille argued that such a curtailment is "unjustifiable"
if either the restriction itself adversely affects the nation's economy and
security, or the restriction is the result of governmental policies or prac-
tices that are inconsistent with U.S. public policy. 30 According to the
petition, denial of the investment tax credit would result in a 15.2 per-
cent increase in the cost to U.S. companies of Japanese-produced n.c.
machining centers and n.c. punching machines.
D. The Allegations i'n the Houdaille Petition
The Houdaille petition alleged that the Japanese Government had
engaged in a variety of "discriminatory or other acts" which had unjusti-
fiably restricted U.S. commerce in violation of Section 103. 3 1 The most
significant of these were as follows:
I. Cooperati've Acti'vtles. The petition claimed that pursuant to the
Temporary Measures Laws, starting in 1956, MITI had encouraged or
directed the industry to take a series of rationalization measures designed
to increase the competitiveness of the industry. The petition claimed, for
example, that in 1968 MITI directed that each machine tool manufac-
turer stop manufacturing those machines for which its share in the indus-
try was less than five percent and the production of which represented
less than twenty percent of the company's total production. The purpose
28 Petition, supra note 1, at 39-42.
29 Id. at 42-45 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 45. The petition also argues that because Congress chose to refer specifically to
discriminatory acts and to tolerance of international cartels, special legal consequences should
attach to these actions; that is, where these acts are shown prima facie to restrict U.S. commerce,
they should be deemed to satisfy per se the criteria of § 48(a)(7)(D)(ii). Petition,supra note 1, at
45.
31 Id. at 150-55. Unless otherwise noted, "Section 103" will refer only to subparagraph
(D) of Section 48(a)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code.
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of this directive was presumably to concentrate manufacturing of partic-
ular types of machines with those companies which had larger (and
therefore more efficient) production runs. 32 The petition also alleged
that until 1970, in furtherance of this directive, no member of the Japan
Machine Tool Builders' Association could manufacture a new type of
machine without permission from the Association. 33 The Association re-
laxed this rule in 1970, but still requires each member planning to intro-
duce a new product to notify the Association, which permits comments
by other members, followed by an attempt at conciliation should any
member object to the introduction. 34
Other actions taken by MITI under these laws, according to the
petition, are the promotion of joint activities in the fields of production,
marketing, and exportation, the promotion of joint research, and the
promotion of standardization within the industry.3 5 The petition
claimed that the cooperative activities of the Japanese machine tool in-
dustry had received formal or informal exemption from the Japanese an-
timonopoly law.
3 6
2. Export Prices. Another major element of the complaint was the
charge that, under the authority of the Export and Import Trading Law,
an export trading association was established in 1978 to regulate the
prices of exports of n.c. lathes and machining centers to the United States
and Canada.3 7 According to the complaint, MITI has required every
exporter to obtain specific approval for the price of each product ex-
ported to the United States. An internal guideline referred to in the peti-
tion suggests that MITI has established a minimum price for such sales,
but the petition argued that this may in fact be a ceiling price.38
3. Tax Concessions, Loans and Grants. The petition described a
number of special tax concessions which it claimed had been granted to
Japanese machine tool makers. These include special depreciation de-
ductions, tax export incentives, and the allowance of certified tax
reserves for overseas market development.3 9 The petition further
claimed that the Japanese machine tool industry had received special
concessionary loans from the Japan Development Bank, the Small Busi-
ness Finance Corporation, the Industral Bank of Japan, the Long-Term
Credit Bank, and the Japan Research Development Corporation. 40 In
addition, according to the petition, the industry had received grants from
32 Id at 63-69.
33 Id. at 70-71.
34 Id. at 73-76.
35 Id. at 78-81, 83-87.
36 Id at 89-91.
37 Id. at 91.
38 Id. at 94-96.
39 Id at 96-102.
40 Id at 102-09.
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the proceeds of wagering on cycle and motorcycle racing, based upon a
1948 law. 4
1
E. The Decision-Making Process Within the US Government
No formal mechanism existed within the Government for handling
complaints under Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971. The
Houdaille case, therefore, was handled in the same manner as petitions
filed under the similarly worded Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
which permits U.S. companies to file complaints when they believe that
discriminatory or unfair acts of foreign governments are interfering with
U.S. commerce. 42 Procedurally, this meant establishing a staff-level in-
teragency task force under the auspices of the Cabinet-level Trade Policy
Committee to review the case. The task force was chaired by the official
in the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) who
chairs the Section 301 interagency task force-an Assistant General
Counsel of the Office of the USTR. Other members of the interagency
group included representatives from the Departments of Treasury, State,
Commerce, Labor, Defense, and Justice, as well as from the Council of
Economic Advisors, the National Security Council, and the Office of
Management and Budget. 43
As deliberations were going on within the task force, the Senate, on
December 21, 1982, passed a sense-of-the-Senate resolution urging the
President to act affirmatively on the Houdaille petition. The resolution,
sponsored by Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), a member of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee, and co-sponsored by twenty-six other senators,
declared that "the Government of Japan has selected the United States
high technology industry in numerically controlled machine tools for
domination through unfair trade practices."'44 The resolution called for
a denial of the investment tax credit for Japanese-manufactured n.c.
machining centers and n.c. punching machines "until the Government of
Japan provides persuasive evidence to the President of the United States
that these and other unfair and discriminatory acts and policies unjustifi-
ably restricting United States commerce have ceased."
45
Despite, or perhaps because of, this pressure from the Senate, the
interagency task force was unable to reach a consensus in the Houdaille
case for some time. Moreover, one Senator, Steven Symms of Idaho (R),
reacted strongly against the Senate resolution when he introduced into
41 Id at 109-14.
42 Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)-(b) (1982) authorizes the President to
retaliate against such acts by imposing quotas or other import restrictions on imports from the
country in question if negotiation with the foreign government fails to produce a satisfactory
resolution. See also Petition, supra note 1, at 63-69.
43 Interagency Group Studying Tax Credit impications of the Houdatlle Case, 163 DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES LL-1 (BNA) (Aug. 23, 1982).
44 See S. Res. 525, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S15961, S15991 (Dec. 21, 1982).
45 Id
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the record on January 26, 1983, a report published in late 1981 by the
National Machine Tool Builders' Association (NMTBA), of which
Houdaille is a member. 46 The NMTBA report concluded that:
the strong competition from the Japanese machine tool industry is pri-
marily the result of the willingness of management to invest heavily in
its future, market its products aggressively throughout the world, work
doggedly toward long-term goals, and pay an unusual amount of atten-
tion to the training and motivation of its workforce.
47
Also, at about this time, the attorneys for three Japanese trade
groups48 submitted a special letter to the USTR complaining that the
Houdaille proceeding had become "irreparably tainted and impaired"
by procedural irregularities. The letter referred in particular to the
USTR's failure to respond to a request for a hearing, ex parte meetings
that had not been made public, written submissions to the USTR office
that also had not been made public, and remarks by an official from the
Commerce Department suggesting that the Houdaille investigation was
being improperly influenced by such extraneous political considerations
as the Senate resolution.
49
The U.S. Government made no formal response to the letter from
the Japanese trade groups, and by March 1983 had still not reached a
decision in the Houdaille case. In light of the Government's inaction, the
NMTBA opened a second front in the battle against imports on March
10, 1983, by filing a petition with the Commerce Department under Sec-
tion 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.50 That statute authorizes
the President to "take such action, and for such time, as he deems neces-
sary" to effect relief from the imports when an article is being imported
into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as
to threaten to impair the national security. The petition by the NMTBA
argued that the machine tool industry was critically important for na-
tional defense and that the current level of machine tool imports im-
paired the national security. The NMTBA requested that the
Government limit foreign producers of machine tools to 17.5 percent of
the domestic market over a five-year period.
5 1
46 129 CONG. REC. S68 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). The NMTBA consists of close to 300
domestic manufacturing companies which produce approximately 85% of the machine tools
made in the United States.
47 129 CONG. REC. S68 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983).
48 The three trade groups are the Japan Machine Tool Builders' Association, the Japan
Metal Forming Machine Builders' Association, and the Japan Machinery Exporters'
Association.
49 USTR Asked to Terminate floudaille Case; US Seen Nearing Decision, 27 DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES LL-I (BNA) (Feb. 2, 1983).
50 Petition under the National Security Clause, § 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
19 U.S.C. § 1862, for Adjustment of Imports of Machine Tools, submitted by National Machine
Tool Builders' Association (Mar. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as NMTBA Petition). The
NMTBA petition is unrelated to the Houdaille petition. The industry appeal addresses the
threat posed by the level of imports from all countries, whereas the Houdaille petition cites
specific unfair trade practices by Japan.
51 NMTBA Petition, supra note 50, at 220. As noted above, see supra note 12, it has been
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The NMTBA petition may have defused some of the pressure on the
U.S. Government to take action against Japanese-produced machine
tools under the Houdaille petition. In any event, one month later, on
April 22, 1983, the Government issued a terse statement denying relief in
the Houdaille case and stating instead its intention to pursue discussions
with the Government of Japan on industrial policy.5 2 A Houdaille
spokesman stated that the company is now "awaiting the outcome of
these talks and considering its options."' 53
The lack of a formal opinion by the U.S. Government, elaborating
on reasons for denying relief, suggested that the decision may have been
politically motivated. It also left unanswered numerous questions as to
whether Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 could serve as a new
trade remedy to restrict imports into the United States. Several of those
issues will now be addressed.
II. Issues Raised by the Houdaille Case
As already noted, the Houdaille petition represented the first time
that a party had invoked Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 as a
trade remedy. That fact alone made the case significant. The trade bar
eagerly awaited the Government's decision with the hope of learning
what factors the Government deemed significant in a Section 103 case
and whether Section 103 might become a powerful, new trade remedy
for domestic industries attempting to restrict imports into the United
States. The Government's two-paragraph announcement of its decision,
however, fell far short of fulfilling those expectations. Indeed, the deci-
sion left many issues open and the trade bar continues to speculate about
the significance of Section 103 as a trade remedy.
reported that the Commerce Department has made an affirmative recommendation for import
relief to President Reagan.
52 See supra note 3. According to various press reports, government groups supporting the
Houdaille petition included representatives from the USTR and some sections of the Commerce
and Defense Departments. On the other hand, representatives from the Treasury, Justice, and
other sections of the Commerce and Defense Departments, as well as representatives from the
Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers consistently opposed
the granting of relief under § 103. See 81 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES LL-2 (BNA) (April 26,
1983); 56 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES LL-I, 2 (BNA) (Mar. 22, 1983); Wall St. J., Mar. 29,
1983 at 1, 33.
It has been reported that there was unanimous agreement at the subcabinet level that the
facts were sufficient to warrant a Presidential finding that Japan had engaged in a series of
"unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory" acts, each of which burdened or restricted U.S.
commerce, that these conclusions were endorsed at the cabinet level, and that the final decision
to deny any relief to Houdaille was made by President Reagan at the request of Prime Minister
Nakasone of Japan, in order to avoid embarrassing the Prime Minister prior to the June elec-
tions in Japan. Copaken, supra, note 1, at 212. It should be noted that Mr. Copaken repre-
sented Houdaille in the Section 103 proceeding. Id. at 213 n.9.
53 Latona Testimony, supra note 8, at 2. The spokesman added that it is still possible that
Houdaille may file an action under § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 241 i(a)-(b)
(1982). Id. at 1. See supra note 42.
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A. Is Section 103 Intended to Apply to Government Actions Which
Promote Exports to the United States as Well as Those Which
Inhibit Exports from the United States?
The provision of Section 103 which Houdaille sought to invoke is
that part which forbids a foreign country from "engag[ing] in discrimi-
natory or other acts (including tolerance of international cartels) or poli-
cies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce . . . .'54 In its
petition, Houdaille attempted to interpret this prohibition as permitting
the President to retaliate against action by a foreign government which
unjustifiably causes "a curtailment of sales by U.S. companies or the dis-
placement of such business by sales offoreign products .'55
In support of the Houdaille argument, it is true that the term
"United States commerce," which is used in the relevant provision of
Section 103, normally applies to U.S. domestic commerce as affected by
both imports and exports. But an examination of the express language of
congressional reports and statements accompanying the enactment of
Section 103, as well as similar reports relating to Section 252(b) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (from which the language of Section 103
was borrowed), clearly indicates that Congress intended Section 103 to
apply only to actions of foreign governments which unjustifiably restrict
U.S. exports; Congress did not contemplate that the statute would be
used to retaliate against activities designed to promote imports to the
United States.
The actual language in question in Section 103 was added by the
members of the Conference Committee considering the Revenue Act of
1971. The report of that Committee does not elaborate on the meaning
of the language used. However, a congressional summary of the new stat-
ute stated that it gave the President authority to exclude imported goods
from the investment tax credit "with respect to the products of any coun-
try that maintains non-tari trade restrictions (including variable import fees)
which substantially burden, discriminate against or unjustifiably restrict
United States commerce."' 56 Moreover, when presenting the Act as re-
ported out of the Conference Committee, Representative Wilbur Mills,
then Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,5 7 stated on
the floor of the House of Representatives that under Section 103 the
President could withdraw the investment tax credit with respect to prod-
54 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) (1982). The other substantive provision in § 103 condemns
trade restrictions "which substantially burden United States commerce in a manner inconsis-
tent with provisions of trade agreement." 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D)(i) (1982). Houdaille did not
allege that the actions of the Japanese Government were inconsistent with the provisions of any
trade agreements.
55 Petition, supra note 1, at 44 (emphasis added).
56 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL PROVI-
SIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 92-178, THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (comm. print
1971) (emphasis added).
57 The House Ways and Means Committee was the committee in the House responsible
for considering the bill which became the Revenue Act of 1971.
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ucts from a country which "maintains burdensome non-tariff trade re-
strictions against U.S. exports or engages in discriminatory actions or
policies which unjustifiably restrict US exports."'58
Further support for the proposition that Congress intended the au-
thority under Section 103 to be exercised only to retaliate against restric-
tions imposed by foreign countries on U.S. exports comes from the
Finance Committee's Report on the Senate's version of Section 103,
which was presented to the Conference Committee. The Senate Report
stated:
It is expected that the President, in deciding which types of foreign pro-
duced articles to make eligible for the investment credit, will take into
account differences in the way similar (or perhaps different) classes of
articles are treated by the foreign country in the case of imports from the
United States. In the case of motion pictures, for example, it is antici-
pated that the extent to which foreign produced motion pictures become
eligible for the investment tax credit will be made dependent, to a sub-
stantial degree, on whether the foreign country discrtminates either against the
U S motion picture showings tn its country or discriminates in favor of its domesti-
cally produced motion pictures .59
Similarly, Senator Russell Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, 6° stated at the time that Section 103 would empower the Presi-
dent to "deny the investment tax credit for equipment from a country
where, for example, they are discriminating against the United States
with regard to the same commodity." 6'
Finally, support for the view that Section 103 is directed only
against activities which inhibit U.S. exports is provided by the language
and legislative history of Section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. The Conference Committee which reported the Revenue Act of
1971 noted that "[t]he trade restrictions and discriminatory acts referred
to by [Section 103] are the same as those contained in Section 252(b) of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962."62 When Section 252(b) had been
enacted, the Senate Finance Committee explained its meaning as fol-
lows: "Subsections (a) and (b) of section 252 of the bill together author-
ize action against burdensome foreign import restrctions.'"63 Moreover, the
heading of Section 252 as enacted was "FOREIGN IMPORT RE-
STRICTIONS." Again, this suggests that it was only directed at activi-
58 117 CONG. REC. 45,855 (1971) (emphasis added).
59 S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971) (emphasis added).
60 The Senate Finance Committee was the committee in the Senate responsible for consid-
ering the bill which became the Revenue Act of 1971.
61 117 CONG. REC. 42,664 (1971).
62 H.R. RE'. No. 708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1971). The only difference between the two
statutes is in the type of retaliation they authorize the President to take. Under the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252(b)(2), 76 Stat. § 872, 879 (repealed 1975),
which was reenacted in expanded form as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the President
could impose restrictions in the form of quotas or increased tariffs on the importation of goods
from the country concerned. The remedy under § 103, of course, is to deny the investment tax
credit.
63 S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1962) (emphasis added).
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ties of foreign governments which restrict imports into their country from
the United States, and not at actions designed to stimulate exports from
the foreign country to the United States. Indeed, when Section 252 was
reenacted and expanded in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to cover
subsidies on products exported to the United States,64 the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means noted that: "Section 252 of the 1962 act...
restricts the authority to deal with unfair practices against US. industrial
exports ... "65
B. Is Section 103 Intended To Be Directed at the "Industrial Policy" of
Other Countries?
Many of the activities about which Houdaille complained so vocif-
erously could be viewed as nothing more than the successful application
of industrial policy by the Government of Japan. Indeed, Houdaille ob-
jected to activities which were undertaken at the direction of MITI, and
which were in accordance with the authority granted by the three Tem-
porary Measures Laws and the Export and Import Trade Law. The
U.S. Government has generally avoided enacting and implementing leg-
islation comparable to those Japanese laws. The United States has never
officially endorsed an "industrial policy," in the belief that the market-
place is the most effective allocator of resources. 66 However, the United
States must recognize that many other industrialized countries, such as
Japan, do not share this laissez-faire attitude and, in fact, have estab-
lished industrial policies. The issue, of course, is how U.S. trade law
should respond to these actions by foreign governments.
U.S. trade law does seek to prevent the results of certain foreign
government industrial policies from having an adverse impact on U.S.
business, by providing a regulatory mechanism between those policies
and the domestic marketplace. The traditional import relief laws are
directed at offsetting the effects of specifically defined "unfair trade prac-
tices," such as subsidization or unfairly low pricing,6 7 at providing tem-
porary relief where an industry is seriously threatened by imports,68 or at
providing such relief when an article is being imported in sufficient
quantities as to threaten the national security of the United States.69
64 Section 103 has not been broadened in this way.
65 H. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1974) (emphasis added).
66 There are of course a number of exceptions to this, such as the government bail-outs of
Chrysler and Lockheed. A number of government officials and commentators believe that the
U.S. Government will have to play a greater role in the allocation of resources if the United
States is to remain competitive in the world marketplace. See,e.g., Weil, U.S. Industrial Pohy: A
Process in Need of a Federal Industrial Coordination Board, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 981 (1983).
67 See supra note 24. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (1982) (countervailing duty pro-
visions); Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & West Supp. 1983); Trade Act of
1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
68 See supra note 25. See generally Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982) (the
"escape clause").
69 See generally Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 232(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1982); Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
1984]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
These laws each provide a form of relief which is targeted at a specific
problem and is designed to remedy that problem without imposing any
sort of punitive measures. To interpret Section 103 as permitting retalia-
tion against the industrial policy of foreign governments would be quite
different.
Using the denial of the investment tax credit under Section 103 as a
means of responding to the effects of another country's industrial policy
would be a radical change in U.S. trade law for at least two reasons.
First, unlike other trade laws, Section 103 would be aimed not against a
specific problem-such as a government subsidy-but against broad
governmental policies encompassing a variety of programs, with no clear
causal relationship between particular programs and the alleged unjusti-
fiable effects. The degree to which the Section 103 remedy might call
into question a wide range of the foreign government's programs would
doubtless antagonize the foreign government and lead to charges against
the United States of undue interference with the internal policies of the
foreign government. 70
Second, also unlike other trade laws, the relief granted by Section
103 is not moderated by the degree of harm that has been caused. Most of
the traditional import relief laws are designed so that at least in theory
the relief granted is tailored to the amount of harm caused by the im-
ports. 7' The relief afforded by Section 103, denial of the investment tax
70 However, at least in part due to the publicity given to the targeting issue by the
Houdaille case, the Subcommittee on Trade of the House of Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means has reported out a trade bill which includes a provision on targeting. Under
this provision, the countervailing duty statute would be expanded to include any "export target-
ing subsidy," defined as "any government plan or scheme consisting of coordinated actions...
that are bestowed on a specific enterprise, industry, or group thereof. . . the effect of which is
to assist the beneficiary to become more competitive in the export of any class or kind of mer-
chandise." According to the report, examples of "export targeting subsidies" include the exer-
cise of government control over banks that would require diversion of private capital on
favorable terms to specific beneficiaries, government involvement in promoting or encouraging
anticompetitive behavior, such as relaxation of antitrust rules, and special protection of the
home market to permit the development of competitive exports. SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON H.R. 4784: TRADE
REMEDIES REFORM AcT OF 1984, at 18-19 (Comm. Print 1984.) The new provision would
require the Department of Commerce to use a method of calculation which to the extent possi-
ble reflects the full benefit of the subsidy to the beneficiary over the period during which the
subsidy has had an effect. Id. at 19.
71 For example, antidumping and countervailing duties are designed to offset the amount
of less-than-fair-value margins and subsidies, respectively. In a Section 201 proceeding, the
International Trade Commission is required to determine the amount of relief "which is neces-
sary to prevent or remedy" the injury. Trade Act of 1974, §201(d)(l)(A), 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(d)(l)(A) (1982). Other import relief laws provide the President with discretion to take
those steps he deems appropriate to remedy the trade problem. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974,
§ 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982); Trade Expansion Act, § 232(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1982).
The targeting provisions of the legislation recently reported out by the Trade Subcommittee of
the House Ways and Means Committee would require the imposition of a countervailing duty
in an amount equal to the benefit received by the exporting companies from the practices at
issue. See supra note 70.
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credit, is not correlated in any way to the degree of harm suffered by
U.S. industry due to the challenged activities.
Thus, it does not seem appropriate to use Section 103 to combat the
industrial policy of other countries. To permit the use of Section 103 in a
case such as that brought by Houdaille would be to provide an unwieldy
remedy which excessively interferes with a broad range of the internal
policies of a foreign government, and is sensitive neither to the particular
acts causing the trade problems nor to the degree of harm which has
resulted. These concerns are especially troublesome because there is no
evidence in the legislative history of the statute that it was intended to
have such a sweeping application. Section 103 relief under these circum-
stances might have an adverse effect on United States purchasers that
would be out of all proportion to whatever damage was being caused to
U.S. producers.
C Should Rel'ef Be Granted Under Section 103 Against Practices Which
May Be More Appropriately Dealt With Under Other Statutes?
The decision whether or not. to grant relief under Section 103 is a
matter of total discretion with the President. 72 His failure to take action
would not normally be subject to judicial review. 73 For some of the very
reasons discussed in the previous subsection, it may be appropriate for
the President, in deciding whether or not to exercise his discretion, to
consider whether the petitioner could have sought relief which was more
closely tailored to the actions about which it complained.
For example, as noted above, the petition alleged that the Japanese
machine tool industry received a number of concessionary loans and out-
right grants from various governmental and quasi-governmental agen-
cies. Such loans and grants would almost certainly be covered by the
U.S. countervailing duty statute.7 4 If the loans and grants were deter-
mined to be "subsidies" within the meaning of the statute, and such sub-
sidies had caused "material injury" to the U.S. industry, they would be
72 Some of the other import relief statutes similarly confer discretion on the President.
Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982) (the "escape clause") gives the President the
power to reject a recommendation by the International Trade Commission for import relief,
although such a rejection is subject to congressional override. The President may override an
ITC decision to impose relief under the Tarriff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982), and
in this case there is no congressional override. The antidumping and countervailing duties stat-
utes, on the other hand, give no discretion to the executive branch. If there is a finding of less-
than-fair-value selling or subsidization on the one hand, and material injury on the other,
dumping or countervailing duties must be imposed. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (1982).
73 It is possible that had the President stated that his sole reason for declining to take
action was that the statute did not cover the kind of activity challenged, the petitioner could
have obtained review in the courts. See generally Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771,
791 & n.25 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
74 Deferral of Japanese income tax on export earnings and preferential financing by Japa-
nese Government agencies have been held to be subsidies within the meaning of the counter-
vailing duty law. See, e.g., Ceran Scales and Weghing Machineg From Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,590
(1980).
19841
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
offset by additional duties imposed on future imports. Obviously this is a
much more specific remedy than the lifting of the investment tax
credit.75
The petitioner argued at some length that the encroachment of im-
ports from Japan "seriously compromises the defense and security of the
nation, '76 because n.c. machining centers and n.c. punching machines
are essential for the manufacture of weapons systems and other defense
equipment. 77 Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 specifi-
cally authorizes the President "to adjust the imports" of any article
where he determines that the article is being imported into the United
States "in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to
impair the national security." 78 Indeed, shortly before the Government
ruled against Houdaille under Section 103, the NMTBA invoked Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 in instituting an action against
machine tool importers. 79 If the NMTBA prevails in its case, then the
remedy imposed will be directly related to relieving the harm caused by
a particular problem, ile., the impairment of the national security by the
importation of machine tools.
Another possible avenue of relief would be Section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974, which authorizes the President to impose import relief
where a domestic industry is being seriously injured by increased im-
ports. 80 Houdaille claims that "the precipitous decline in market share
suffered by the domestic machine-tool producers may lead, if present
trends continue, to the collapse of the industry."8 If that claim is cor-
rect, there might well be a good case for relief under Section 201. The
odds of success under this statute are not very great, however; import
relief has in fact been granted in only one quarter of the Section 201
cases brought since 1974.82
The United States trade laws do not, of course, establish a pecking
order for the appropriate statute to be invoked in situations where more
than one statute may be applicable. Nor do those laws necessarily limit
the number of statutes which can be invoked. In at least one trade case,
75 One reason why Houdaille may have preferred Section 103 is that it may have believed
that it would have been difficult to show "material injury" under the countervailing duty stat-
ute. See generally ithia notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
76 Petition, supra note 1, at 143.
77 Id. at 142-50.
78 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1982).
79 NMTBA petition, supra note 50.
80 Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982). See supra note 25.
81 Petition, supra note 1, at 144.
82 See, e.g., THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 - FOUR YEARS LATER (H. Apple-
baum & A. Victor, eds.) (Prac. L. Inst. 1983). However, import relief was granted in the two
most recently completed investigations. See Stainless Steel, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,177 (1983); Heavy-
weight Motorcycles, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639 (1983). Probably as a result of these decisions, a
number of Section 201 cases were filed in early 1984. See, e.g., Certain Canned Tuna Fish, 49
Fed. Reg. 8501 (1984); Unwrought Copper, 49 Fed. Reg. 5842 (1984); Carbon and Certain Steel
Alloy Products, 49 Fed. Reg. 5838 (1984); Nonrubber Footwear, 49 Fed. Reg. 4857 (1984).
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however, the President decided not to grant relief on the ground that
relief was available under another statute. In Welded Stainless Steel Ppe
and Tube, 83 a case under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,84 the In-
ternational Trade Commission had based its affirmative decision on its
finding that the respondents had made sales in the United States below
the variable cost of production. In his decision disapproving the Com-
mission's determination, the President noted that relief against such sales
was available to the petitioner under the antidumping statute.8 5 There
is some basis, therefore, for the principle that the remedy which is least
intrusive to notions of free trade should be the one imposed first.
It could be argued, of course, that WeldedStainless is not a precedent
for a case such as Houdaille, for at least two reasons. First, in the Welded
Stainless case a separate antidumping investigation by the Treasury De-
partment was already in progress when the Section 337 action was insti-
tuted.8 6 Second, the only actions covered by the Section 337 decision
were sales below cost, which were also covered by the antidumping inves-
tigation. Houdaille, on the other hand, alleged a whole series of"unjusti-
fiable" actions, only some of which are covered by other statutes.
Nevertheless, if the President had lifted the investment tax credit in
response to the Houdaille petition, Houdaille or other members of the
U.S. machine tool industry would still have been permitted to file subse-
quent petitions under other statutes, such as the countervailing duty or
national security provisions,8 7 and obtain additional relief. This would
raise the spectre of "multiple legal harassment," a matter of some contro-
versy in the trade relations between the United States and Japan. It
seems desirable, therefore, to limit resort to multiple trade remedies by
requiring that less intrusive statutes be utilized first. This would make
relief under Section 103 appropriate only when remedies such as coun-
tervailing duties are either not available or have been exhausted.
D. Should Section 103 Be Invoked in the Case of Past Conduct?
Many of the actions about which Houdaille seemed to be most con-
cerned took place a number of years ago. For example, the MITI direc-
tive that companies cease making those products for which they had
83 43 Fed. Reg. 17,790 (1978).
84 Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & West Supp. 1983). The Act is
designed to prevent unfair acts or methods of competition in the importation of articles into the
United States which results in substantial injury to a U.S. industry, or restrains or monopolizes
trade and commerce in the United States.
85 43 Fed. Reg. 17,790 (1978).
86 Although the Treasury Department did subsequently find that there had been sales at
less than fair value, the International Trade Commission made a no-injury determination, so
that no dumping duties were imposed. See 43 Fed. Reg. 32,468 (1978).
87 The National Machine Tool Builders' Association actually initiated its action under the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1962(b), prior to a decision in the Houdaille
case. Interestingly, the complaint in the NMTBA case does not mention the Houdaille petition.
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small market shares was issued in 1968.88 The industry association's
power to veto the introduction of new types of products by individual
manufacturers was replaced in 1970 by a system of notification and con-
ciliation.8 9 An export tax exemption complained of in the petition was
withdrawn in 1964.90 Many of the concessionary loans by various gov-
ernmental and quasi-governmental agencies were made in the 1950s and
1960s.9 1 So far as one can tell from the petition, the MITI directives in
effect today are confined largely to such relatively innocuous matters as
the encouragement of standardization and the improvement of distribu-
tion channels.
92
The Japanese Government argued in response to the Houdaille peti-
tion that it would be improper to penalize Japan's machine tool industry
today for actions which may have benefited it in the past, but which are
no longer taking place. 93 Otherwise, the industry would always be under
a stigma which could never be fully removed. Indeed, not only are the
present actions of the Japanese Government few in number, many of
them are broadly similar to those followed by the U.S. Government. 94
Houdaille responded that the Japanese industry occupies its strong posi-
tion today because of its allegedly unjustifiable acts in the past; however,
that argument alone does not seem to warrant imposition of the Section
103 remedy now.
Under other U.S. trade laws, once a petition is filed, the government
begins an investigation in accordance with the particular legal remedy
invoked. For example, under the countervailing duty law, the Depart-
ment of Commerce would ultimately have to determine whether or not a
subsidy is being provided with respect to the merchandise in question,
and the International Trade Commission would ultimately have to de-
cide whether the domestic industry is materially injured, or is threatened
with material injury.95 The investigation and subsequent determinations
88 Petition, supra note 1, at 63-64.
89 Id. at 73-76.
90 Id at 97-98.
91 Id. at 103.
92 It.should be noted, however, that Houdaille asserted in comments submitted subse-
quent to the petition that the funds given to the Japanese machine tool industry from the
proceeds of bicycle and motorcycle race wagering are currently quite substantial - nearly 113
million dollars annually. Petition to the President of the United States through the Office of the
United States Trade Representative for the Exercise of Presidential Discretion Authorized by
Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D), Comments by the Petitioner,
at 3 (July 31, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Comments by the Petitioner].
93 Japanese Government's Response to U.S. Government Concerning Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Petition filed by Houdaille Industries, ITIM, supra note 20, at 632 (Aug. 18, 1982).
94 For example, under the DISC program U.S. companies may defer income tax on their
income from exports. 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-994 (1982). In addition, the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982), and the Export Trading Company Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 1233 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4001) each permit
U.S. competitors to form a joint export association which has power to fix prices for exports in a
fashion similar to the machine tool export association described in the Houdaille petition.
95 Se 19 U.S.C. § 1671(d).
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are of course made with regard to current imports, not those of years
past. This is in accord with the principle of directing relief against the
particular harm now being caused by a particular trade problem. The
same principle should apply to the use of Section 103.
A further argument against the use of Section 103 for past actions is
that its primary purpose was to give the President power to bargain with
other countries over the removal of discriminatory actions against U.S.
products.9 6 This purpose would not be served by the taking of retaliatory
action where the practices complained of had already ceased.
E What i's the Appropriate Injur Standard Under Section 103?
The relevant provision of Section 103 applies to acts or policies of
foreign governments which have the effect of "unjustifiably restricting
United States commerce."'97 This language indicates only that some de-
gree of adverse effect on U.S. companies must be shown before the Presi-
dent may take action under this provision. 98
The only allegation of harm in the Houdaille petition was that im-
ports from Japan have captured a substantially increased share of the
domestic machine tool market. The petition claimed that between 1976
and 1981 Japanese imports of n.c. machining centers rose from 3.7 per-
cent to 50.1 percent of the units in the market, and imports of n.c. punch-
ing machines rose from 4.7 percent to 37.6 percent. 99 However, tables in
the petition also revealed that, although U.S. manufacturers have lost a
corresponding percentage share of the United States market, they have in
fact expanded their sales in absolute terms quite dramatically over the
same period:
1976 1981100
U.S. Manufacturers' 1,225 units 2,120 units
Sales of N.C. $189.8m. $512.0m.
Machining Centers
U.S. Manufacturers' 274 units 477 units
Sales of N.C. $33.1m. $95.6m.
Punching Machines
96 During the floor debate on Section 103, Senator Russell Long, the floor manager of the
bill, stated: "There are all sorts of discriminations against American manufacturers, so where it
is desirable the President should have this too. He could deny the tax advantage of investment
tax credit to the other country's commodity if they do not discontinue theer d crimtnation against our
commodity." 117 CONG. REC. 42,664 (1971) (emphasis added).
97 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) (1982).
98 A number of petitions have been filed under the similarly worded Trade Act of 1974,
§ 301, 19 U.S.C. § 241 I(a)-(b) (1982). However, the issue of the degree of injury necessary to
establish a case under Section 301 does not seem to have come up in any of them. It is impossi-
ble to be certain about this because the Government does not publish detailed statements of
reasons supporting its determinations under Section 301.
99 These increases in market share of units of the respective machine tools correspond to
an increase in dollar value market share from 2.1 percent in 1976 to 38.2 percent in 1981 for n.c.
machining centers, and from 5.8 percent in 1976 to 37.1 percent in 1981 for n.c. punching
machines. See Petition, supra note 1, at 125.
10o Projected on basis of first nine months. Id
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It is clear from this table that the market in the United States for the
products in question has been expanding rapidly since 1976. While the
import penetration figures show that Japanese imports have enjoyed a
disproportionate share of the expansion, the petition did not allege that
U.S. manufacturers have lost sales or suffered from depressed profits or
surplus capacity-typical indicia of injury in traditional import relief
cases-as a result of the imports from Japan.
There is, of course, a broad spectrum of possible approaches to the
injury question. At one extreme, it could be argued that where the ac-
tions complained of are comparable to acts that would be declared per se
illegal under the U.S. antitrust laws,i0 ' they should be considered by
their very nature to have the necessary restrictive effect on U.S. com-
merce, so that no specific showing of adverse effect should be necessary.
This was in fact Houdaille's primary position, 10 2 and the discussion in
the petition of loss of market share by the U.S. industry was simply
designed to buttress the case for import relief.
The other extreme would be a test similar to either the "serious in-
jury" test under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which requires
injury "of grave or important proportions,"10 3 or, slightly less severe, the
"material injury" test contained in the countervailing duties and an-
tidumping laws. 104 In either case, a mere showing of loss of market share
would probably not be sufficient for an affirmative finding. The peti-
tioner in such a case would almost certainly have to show other adverse
effects of the import competition, such as loss of specific sales, price sup-
pression, decline of profits, or lowered capacity utilization.
It is unlikely that Congress, without specifically so providing, in-
tended such a stringent "injury" test under Section 103. On the other
hand, it would seem inappropriate for the President to take the drastic
step of removing the investment tax credit from imported products with-
out some showing of harm to the competing domestic industry. If the
per se rule urged by Houdaille had been adopted, the investment tax
credit could have been lifted in a situation where the imports might have
had no impact on the domestic industry because that industry was al-
ready working to capacity and could not meet additional orders. In this
situation, U.S. purchasers of the product in question would be harmed
by the lifting of the tax credit, and the United States would expose itself
to possible international repercussions, without any offsetting benefit to
the petitioning industry. Thus, it seems appropriate for the U.S. Govern-
ment, before acting on a petition under Section 103, to satisfy itself that
101 Certain activities, such as price-fixing and market-sharing among competitors, are re-
garded as so inherently anticompetitive that they are automatically treated as illegal under the
antitrust laws. It is no defense to show that such activities did not in fact have an adverse effect
on competition. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
102 Petition, supra note 1, at 46-47, 139-42.
103 See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1982).
104 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2) (1982).
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the domestic industry has been adversely affected in some fashion by the
imports in question.
F Would Apph'cation of Section 103 Violate the International
Obligations of the United States?
The Houdaille petition conceded' 0 5 that at first glance the relief
sought would appear to violate both the "national treatment"'' 0 6 and the
"most-favored-nation" principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), 10 7 as well as Article XVI(1) of the U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (the FCN Treaty),
which requires each party to give national treatment 0 8 and most-fa-
vored-nation treatment' 0 9 to the products of the other party. The peti-
tion claimed, however, that Section 103 action was justified in this case
under the national security exception in Article XXI of GATT and in
Article XXI(l) of the FCN Treaty. t °
The relevant part of Article XXI of GATT provides that nothing in
GATT shall be construed to prevent any contracting party from taking
action which it considers necessary for protection of its essential security
interests. Essential security interests are those "relating to the traffic in
arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other
goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment.""' The petition claimed that Ar-
105 Petition, supra note 1, at 158.
106 The national-treatment principle is embodied in Article 111(2) of GATT. That princi-
ple requires that imports "not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other inter-
nal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1949, art. III,
61 Stat. A3, A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
107 The most-favored-nation principle is embodied in Article 1(1) of GATT. That principle
requires that equal treatment be given to imports from all members of the GATT. Id art. 1, 61
Stat. at A12, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
108 Article XXII(l) of the FCN Treaty defines "national treatment" in the case of products
to mean "treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than
the treatment accorded therein, in like situation, to. . . products . . . of such Party." Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, April 2, 1953, United States-Japan, art. XXII, 4 U.S.T.
2079-80, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. [hereinafter cited as Japan FCN treaty].
109 Article XXII(2) of the Japan FCN Treaty defines "most-favored-nation treatment" as
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to products of any third country. Id
10 The petition also asserted that as a matter of U.S. domestic law, neither GATT nor the
Japan FCN Treaty can prevail over § 103, which was enacted after conclusion of the Treaty
and adoption of GATT. Petition, supra note 1, at 156-57. However, § 7852(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that "[n]o provision of [Title 26] shall apply in any case where its
application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date
of this title [August 16, 1954 -when both GATT and the FCN Treaty were already in effect]."
26 U.S.C. § 7852(d) (1982). In any event, it seems highly unlikely that the President would take
discretionary action that would violate international obligations of the United States, and
would require the United States to provide compensation or face retaliation, particularly at a
time when the United States is itself seeking to enforce GATT more vigorously than ever before.
See GATT,.supra note 106, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
Article XXI(1) of the Japan FCN Treaty is a similar national security provision. More-
over, Article XXI(3) of the Japan FCN Treaty incorporates by reference the national security
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ticle XXI applied to the present case because n.c. machining centers and
n.c. punching machines are essential for the manufacture of weapons sys-
tems and other defense equipment."t
2
Commentators on GATT have observed that although a national
security exception to GATT is clearly necessary, the self-judging excep-
tion in Article XXI provides an easy excuse for protectionist policies.
Kenneth Dam has written:
One danger is that the national security argument is almost infi-
nitely expandable. Protectionist claims based on national security inter-
ests are put forth not only for products used by the military but also for
civilian products. . . .The arguments favoring such restrictions are
based on the notion that the product in question is produced by an in-
dustry that also supplies the military and that would in time of war be
called upon greatly to expand its production. . . .In times of competi-
tive pressure, almost every industry can produce an argument along na-
tional security lines. 1 13
John Jackson, another noted expert on GATT, has also warned that Ar-
ticle XXI constitutes "a dangerous loophole to the obligations of the
GATT."' 14
The U.S. Government would have to scrutinize a national security
claim with great care before relying on it to avoid obligations under
GATT and under an FCN Treaty. I -' Indeed, the national security pro-
vision has been officially invoked only once in the history of GATT.
That instance came in 1949, when Czechoslovakia brought a complaint
against the imposition of U.S. export controls, and the United States
used Article XXI to defend its action. 116
There is some question, however, as to whether Article 111(2), the
national treatment provision of GATT, even applies to income taxes at
all, as opposed to taxes on products.' 1 7 This issue does not appear to
have been formally resolved by GATT.I"' One of the leading commen-
tators on GATT takes the view that Article 111(2) does not apply to in-
come tax," t9 while another leaves the question open.120
rules of GATT. Only the GATT provisions will be referred to in the subsequent discussion.
Japan FCN treaty, supra note 109, art. XXI, 4 U.S.T. at 2078-79, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
112 Petition, supra note 1, at 160-61.
113 K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 201
(1970).
114 J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748 (1969).
115 The U.S. Government has required petitioners to make a strong showing of harm to the
national security in cases filed under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862
(1982). Indeed, although a number of petitions have been filed, relief has been granted in only
one case, that involving imports of oil.
116 J. JACKSON, supra note 114, at 749.
117 The investment tax credit provided by Section 38 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 38 (1982), is available as a credit against income tax.
118 Houdaille argued at length in comments it submitted in support of its Petition that the
preparatory work of Article III of GATT demonstrates that income taxes and exemptions there-
from were not intended to be subject to Article I1. See Comments by the Petitioner, supra note
92, at 35-64.
119 K. DAM, supra note 113, at 124.
120 J. JACKSON, supra note 114, at 284-85.
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Even if Article 111(2) does not apply to income tax benefits granted
to purchasers of domestic but not foreign goods, a good argument can be
made that Article 111(4) of GATT does apply. Article 111(4) requires
national treatment for imported goods "in respect of all laws, regulations
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use."'. 2' In one case GATT held that the
granting by the Italian Government of special credit terms to purchasers
of domestic but not imported farm equipment violated Article III(4).1 22
There is little difference in principle or effect between favorable credit
terms granted to purchasers of domestic goods and favorable income tax
treatment. A decision that one practice was banned by Article III while
the other was not would permit highly discriminatory treatment of im-
ports123 based on a rather technical distinction, and would again create a
major loophole in GATT.
III. Conclusion
Regardless of the motive, the U.S. Government acted properly in
denying relief to Houdaille under Section 103 of the Revenue Act.
There is a serious question whether Section 103 was intended to apply to
the type of activities complained about in the Houdaille petition: pre-
dominately past conduct involving the application of industrial policy by
the Government of Japan that was intended to promote exports of
machine tools from Japan rather than inhibit imports of those products
into Japan. In addition, the contention that the U.S. machine tool in-
dustry is being harmed by imports from Japan appears, at least from the
petition, to be rather weak. Moreover, other trade remedies seem to be
more closely tailored to respond to the particular problems alleged in the
petition. Finally, the U.S. Government would have been quite reluctant
to take action which might be challenged under both GATT and the
FCN Treaty, relying solely on the national security exceptions or upon
the technical argument that discriminatory provisions relating to income
tax are not covered by GATT.
This is not to say that Section 103 would never be applicable as a
trade remedy. In limited circumstances Section 103 may provide the
most appropriate relief available. Such a circumstance would probably
involve a situation in which the foreign government in question is cur-
rently taking steps to restrict imports from the United States, and other
U.S. trade remedies did not provide adequate relief to counter this be-
havior. If the domestic industry could then demonstrate a sufficient de-
gree of injury, the retaliatory remedy available under Section 103 of
121 GATT, supra note 106, art. 111(4), 61 Stat. at A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1890.
.122 See GATT Doc. L./833 (1958).
123 The petition estimated that if the investment tax credit is removed from Japanese
machine tools, the price would have to be lowered by about 15% to match the loss of the tax
benefit to the purchaser. Petition, supra note 1, at 155'
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denying the investment tax credit to certain imported products might be
justified. There would be no violation of any international agreements if
the foreign country involved were not a GATT signatory or an FCN
Treaty partner. If the foreign country did belong to GATT, then ideally
the United States would first attempt to exhaust the dispute resolution
procedures provided in Articles XXII and XXIII before acting under
Section 103.
The Houdaille petition, however, was not such a case. Nevertheless,
Houdaille and other members of the U.S. machine-tool industry proba-
bly benefited from the filing of the petition. The petition caused a con-
siderable stir in political circles, and stimulated interest in Congress.
Indeed, bills were introduced that would have denied the investment tax
credit to all imported products.124 By focusing attention on the problems
facing the domestic machine-tool industry, Houdaille made it more
likely that some relief may be granted, although it would not be in the
form requested in the petition.' 25 More broadly, Houdaille forced the
trade bar to examine the merits of the Section 103 remedy for the first
time, increasing the likelihood that the remedy may be successfully in-
voked at some point in the future. Although Section 103 cannot be re-
garded as a major new trade remedy available to domestic industries
seeking to restrict imports into the United States, neither can it be dis-
missed totally. Section 103 must be viewed as another, albeit limited,
remedy in the arsenal of weapons available to those domestic industries.
124 See, e.g., H.R. 6279, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Congressman Hunter introduced the
bill.
125 As already noted, the NMTBA petition filed under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
§ 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982), is still pending before the U.S. Government. See supra notes 50-
51 and accompanying text. See also supra note 70.
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